The United Nation’s latest assessment of Afghanistan’s security institutions highlights a central contradiction in Taliban governance: authorities have created structures intended to promote discipline, but they have not provided enough public evidence that these structures deliver justice. UNAMA’s 38-page report, covering developments since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, notes the issuance of directives, the creation of internal monitoring units and the establishment of bodies tasked with addressing alleged misconduct. Yet the report concludes that accountability remains weakened by opacity, unresolved complaints and barriers that prevent people from reporting abuse safely.
The distinction is crucial. A commission, a court, a decree or an internal office can be presented as a sign of institutional reform, but none is meaningful unless it leads to a visible and consistent process. For accountability to have public value, people must know how to register a complaint, what happens after they do so, whether an investigation takes place, and whether officials found responsible face consequences. The current system provides little publicly available information on these questions.
The assessment identifies the Security and Filtration Commission, the High Directorate of Supervision and Monitoring of Decrees and Edicts, the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Commission for Hearing Complaints, and the Supreme Court as bodies involved in oversight or accountability. It also says that some security personnel accused of misconduct have been arrested and investigated, with certain cases referred to Taliban military courts. These measures indicate that some institutional channels exist. However, the absence of public reporting makes it impossible to judge whether they are used consistently, fairly or independently.
No comprehensive public figures are available on complaints filed, investigations initiated, cases closed, disciplinary decisions issued, prosecutions pursued, convictions reached, or remedies provided to victims. This statistical silence is not a technical problem; it is the main reason the effectiveness of reform cannot be assessed. A security institution cannot establish public trust merely by saying that it monitors itself. It must demonstrate what it investigates, what it finds, and what consequences follow.
The Transparency Test
The report’s strongest warning concerns the effect of secrecy on public confidence and deterrence. As UNAMA’s deputy special representative Georgette Gagnon stated,
“The limited amount of public information on complaints received, investigations conducted, and disciplinary or judicial actions taken by relevant de facto bodies undermine confidence and weaken deterrence,”
— Georgette Gagnon.
This is more than a call for routine press releases. In a system where security personnel can arrest, detain, search, control crowds and use force, transparency is one of the few safeguards against abuse. When alleged misconduct is handled entirely behind closed doors, citizens have no way of knowing whether procedures are fair or whether powerful officials are shielded. They cannot determine whether a complaint was dismissed for lack of evidence, ignored because of influence, delayed without reason, or resolved through a credible process.
The problem also affects security personnel themselves. Clear rules and public enforcement can protect professional officers from arbitrary treatment by defining what conduct is prohibited and what procedure applies when allegations arise. Conversely, opaque discipline creates uncertainty for everyone. It can enable abuse by those who believe they will never be held responsible, while also allowing lower-ranking personnel to be punished selectively without transparent due process.
The United Nation report does not claim that every Taliban security institution is inactive or that no misconduct case has been pursued. Its argument is more precise: without published evidence, the public cannot know whether accountability measures are widespread, impartial or effective. A state’s claim that it enforces rules becomes credible only when it can show that investigations are real, outcomes are recorded and those in authority are subject to the same law as everyone else.
This concern is captured in Gagnon’s second observation:
“Visible and consistent accountability measures indicate that rules are applied equally and to every person, including those in positions of authority,”
— Georgette Gagnon. Visibility, in this sense, is not theatre. It is the mechanism through which equality before the law can be tested.
Fear Turns Complaints Into Silence
The report says many complaints reportedly remain unresolved, while fear of reprisals, lack of trust in Taliban institutions and practical barriers discourage people from coming forward. This means that the existence of a complaint mechanism does not necessarily mean that it is accessible. A citizen may know that an office or commission exists but still decide not to report alleged misconduct if doing so could expose them or their family to intimidation, discrimination, detention or social pressure.
This is the most important practical test of accountability. A system is not safe simply because it accepts complaints. It is safe when complainants can approach it without fearing that their name, address, identity or allegation will be used against them. It is inclusive when people can access it regardless of gender, location, social standing or connection to those in power. It is credible when complainants can expect a timely response and understand what happens to their case.
Women encounter additional obstacles because of restrictions imposed on their daily lives. Their ability to travel, reach offices, speak with officials freely and report sensitive incidents may be limited. This makes accountability not only a question of legal procedure but also a question of access. If women cannot safely use reporting channels, the system cannot be considered equally available to the Afghan population.
The report therefore calls for mechanisms that are safe, accessible and inclusive, allowing allegations of misconduct to be reported without retaliation or discrimination. It also seeks stronger protection for victims, witnesses and whistleblowers, alongside measures to prevent interference in monitoring, complaint handling and investigations. These proposals are central to any Analysis of security-sector reform. Without protection, reporting becomes an act of personal risk. Without independent handling, complaints can become another source of vulnerability.
Discipline Begins Before Abuse
UNAMA argues that accountability should be incorporated into security operations before, during and after they occur. This is a vital point because institutions often treat misconduct only as an individual failure discovered after public outrage or political pressure. But misconduct is also shaped by training, supervision, command decisions, operational procedures and the expectations created inside a security force.
The report calls for clear rules on the use of force, arrests, detention, searches and crowd control, as well as professional codes of conduct for security personnel. It recommends that commanders be responsible for enforcing discipline and that security personnel be required to report misconduct. Serious cases, it says, should be referred to courts when appropriate.
Command responsibility is particularly significant. Security institutions do not operate as a collection of isolated individuals. Personnel work within chains of command where senior officials influence behaviour through orders, incentives, discipline and silence. If commanders fail to investigate allegations or tolerate violations, a culture of impunity can grow. If they respond promptly, record incidents, protect complainants and apply consequences fairly, abuses become harder to conceal and repeat.
UNAMA also urges stronger systems for collecting and maintaining data. Such records could reveal patterns that isolated cases hide: whether allegations are concentrated in particular provinces, units or types of operations; whether certain misconduct repeatedly goes unpunished; and whether reforms are reducing violations over time. Data collection, therefore, is not merely administrative. It is how authorities can prove that discipline is improving rather than simply assert it.
The Weight of Earlier Findings
The urgency of these recommendations is reinforced by earlier UNAMA documentation. In August 2023, the mission recorded at least 800 alleged violations against former government officials and former security-force members from 15 August 2021 to 30 June 2023. The total included 218 extrajudicial killings, 14 enforced disappearances, more than 144 cases of torture and ill-treatment, and 424 arbitrary arrests or detentions. UNAMA said investigations were extremely limited and lacked transparency. These are historical figures rather than new data from the current report, but they illustrate why credible security oversight remains essential.
For the period from 15 August 2021 to 15 June 2022, UNAMA reported 2,106 civilian casualties—700 killed and 1,406 wounded. It also recorded 160 extrajudicial killings, 178 arbitrary arrests or detentions, and 56 cases of torture or ill-treatment involving former officials or former security-force members. Those figures demonstrate that accountability cannot be assessed only through official structures or public assurances; it must be assessed through credible investigations and public evidence of consequences.
The latest report does acknowledge reported arrests, investigations and military-court referrals involving accused security personnel. But isolated examples do not answer the larger question: whether a reliable, system-wide process exists. Without information on the scale, duration and outcome of cases, no one can know whether these actions are routine enforcement, rare exceptions or selective responses to pressure.
Accountability and Afghanistan’s Future
The report connects internal security accountability to Afghanistan’s wider future. Better discipline and transparent justice are not only legal obligations; they are presented as essential to governance, respect for human rights, stability and eventual reintegration into the international community.
That connection is unavoidable. Afghanistan cannot build durable public confidence if citizens believe that security institutions are beyond scrutiny. Nor can it persuade external partners that reform is credible if there is no accessible record of complaints, investigations, disciplinary decisions and judicial outcomes. International engagement depends not only on declarations of reform but on proof that institutions protect rights, restrain abuse and apply rules to those who hold power.
The way forward is not mysterious. Regular publication of complaint data, accessible reporting channels, protection for witnesses, clear operational standards, accountable commanders, impartial investigations and court referrals in serious cases would provide a measurable foundation for reform. They would not erase every allegation or solve every institutional weakness, but they would make performance visible.
Until that happens, Afghanistan’s security reforms will remain difficult to trust. The issue is not that oversight bodies have never been created. It is that their work remains largely hidden from the people whose safety, rights and confidence they are supposed to protect.
